Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis / Volume 51 / Issue 02 / April 2016

分析师跟踪和真实盈余管理：准实验证据

作者：Rustom M. Irani, David Oesch

摘要：我们研究了证券分析师如何影响管理者对不同类型盈余管理的使用。为了得到可靠的因果关系，我们采用了准实验方法---利用因为券商合并而造成的分析师外生性减少。我们发现管理者通过减少真实盈余管理，同时增加权责发生制操作来应对损失。这些效应对具有更少收益覆盖和近乎零收入的公司更加显著。我们的因果关系证据显示，作为对分析师压力的回应，管理者使用真实盈余管理来提高公司短期表现。如果仅基于权责发生制进行研究，这种效应并不明显。

Analyst Coverage and Real Earnings Management: Quasi-Experimental Evidence

Rustom M. Irani, David Oesch

ABSTRACT

We study how securities analysts influence managers’ use of different types of earnings management. To isolate causality, we employ a quasi-experiment that exploits exogenous reductions in analyst following resulting from brokerage house mergers. We find that managers respond to the coverage loss by decreasing real earnings management while increasing accrual manipulation. These effects are significantly stronger among firms with less coverage and for firms close to the zero-earnings threshold. Our causal evidence suggests that managers use real earnings management to enhance short-term performance in response to analyst pressure, effects that are not uncovered when focusing solely on accrual-based methods.

原文链接：

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=10362105&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0022109016000156

翻译：傅亚平